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MODERN TIEolms or LAW. London: Oxford University Press. 1933. pp. vi, 229.
THIs is a job that vastly needed doing. The London School of Economics is to be
congratulated for having seen the need for a presentation of the outstanding modem
legal theories and for having arranged this series of ten lectures to fill it. It must
have required considerable daring to hack a way into the jungle of modem legal
thought and make as much of a clearing as the authors of this symposium have
achieved. For the varieties of legal experience are more than matched by the
varieties of legal thinking. The institutional restraints and lags which hem in the
development of actual legal systems do not operate so effectively to check the growth
of intellectual systems seeking to explain them. The passion for justice or the dun-
derheadedness of the Supreme Court is each in some measure kept within bounds
by the case system, the Constitution, the needs of statesmanship and the compulsions
of the economic process. But the intellectual passion or dunderheadedness of com-
mentators on the Supreme Court can take a bewildering multiplicity of forms, and
the only bounds each knows are the bounds of possibility. All the moot problems of
the philosophic tradition combine with differences in social and political outlook,
economic loyalities, aesthetic temper and national psychology to produce the chaos
which is modem legal thought.
Such are the crooked paths which the ten lecturers who contributed to this
symposium have not feared to tread. Instead of attempting, however, to write a
history of recent legal thought, they have contented themselves with selecting certain
representative or significant thinkers and schools. Certainly this was the more com-
passable task. The jurists selected are the American "realists," Petrazycki, Stammler,
Duguit, Hauriou and Renard, Pound, Kelsen, Gdny, Maine and Austin. The selec-
tion itself raises, as any selection probably would, questions both grave and carping.
An essay on Pound and one on the realists that concentrates on Jerome Frank are
scarcely adequate to express American legal thought; one wonders at the inclusion of
Petrazycki, unless it be on the principle that the small nations should have at least
one representative; Stammler and Kelsen give some of the flavor of German
thought, but both are neo-Kantians and one misses the Hegelian tradition of either
the right or the left; among the French someone like Demogue, outside of the
pluralist-sociologist currents of thought, might have found room; although such
schools as the American realists and the French institutionalists are given, one misses
an essay on the present day Marxian conception of law such as Professor Laski
would have been so qualified to write; and finally, one wonders whether our English
editors are being overly modest or overly frank when they include no English theorist
later than Austin and Maine, one of whom wrote in the shadow of Victoria, the
other of her empire.
The criticism intended here is not in the direction merely of national representa-
tiveness nor even modernity of thinking. I am rather raising the question whether
the realities of modern legal thought emerge at all from an analysis of the systems
of selected individual theorists. Like the biographical approach to history such a
method simplifies the reality, although it may achieve a compensating illusion of
concreteness or certainty. The points 'at which the import of modem juristic think-
ing is most clearly discernible do not lie somewhere in the completed systems of
Stammler, Gdny, Kelsen or Austin, with their patterns of syllogisms like so much
frozen architecture. They lie rather in the thick of the polemical struggle, in the
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making of jurisprudence through the contact and conflict of conceptions. They are
often most clearly revealed by reference to the work of writers outside the proper
sphere of legal theory. Thus there is more to be learned about contemporary English
legal thinking from the work of Maitland in legal history, of Malinowski in anthro-
pology and of Laski in political theory than is to be discovered through a re-examina-
tion of Maine and Austin. According to this conception legal theory is most alive in
the clash of schools and at its points of contact with other disciplines. It is as if
there were a process of Platonic dialectic at work, clarity about legal thought being
evolved through the confronting and resolution of opposites.
But what is not revealed directly in the systems of the subjects of the essays is
more likely to be revealed indirectly through the preconceptions of the essayists.
Each individual essay, as well as the entire selection of subjects, is loaded with a
hypothesis on the part of the writer as to what are the significant issues and positions
today. Unless it is so random and casual an affair as to constitute merely a causerie
it must proceed from a genuine analysis of trends and schools. The sum of the ten
analyses, or ten sets of preconceptions, contained in the book gives a not inadequate
picture of the stuff of contemporary legal thinking. To be sure, it is not the picture
or the impression the authors intended; they do not so much give it as give it away.
The common issues that run through all these essays are not the issues that agitated
the eminent jurists discussed. They are rather those that are now agitating the
writers. It is a commonplace of criticism that we write ourselves and our pet no-
tions into our discussions of other people's ideas. In fact, other people's ideas are
generally the safest currency with which to speculate. Mr. T. S. Eliot once wrote, in
an unsparing essay, that when Medea in the play of Euripides is made to say in the
Gilbert Murray translation, "This thing undreamed of . . . hath sapped my soul: I
dazzle where I stand, the cup of all life shattered in my hand," some of the phrases
were a gift from Mr. Murray. "It is he who has sapped our soul and shattered the
cup of all life for Euripides." What is so true of all criticism and inherent in the
task of translation is even more obvious in the analysis by one legal philosopher of
the system of legal ideas of another. We cannot help translating into the intellectual
currency of our day and circle. The Medea that appears in Mr. Murray's pages is
not the Medea of Euripides but is Medea as seen by Mr. Murray through the eyes
of the pre-Raphaelites, especially Swinburne. The Hauriou, the Maine, the G~ny
that appear in the pages of this book are seen through whatever haze or clarity the
contemporary climate of opinion, especially in English academic circles, offers.
One thing emerges clearly from these essays: the issues that agitate the writers
are not such as to fall easily into the traditional classifications of schools-as, for
example, analytical, historical, philosophical, sociological. Such divisions no longer
express the significant rifts between theorists. They have been broken up into other
divisions or, what is more likely, are criss-crossed by them. The issue of realism and
empiricism crops up in a variety of forms; the claim for a normative or formal
science of law is pitted against an institutional emphasis of one sort or another;
pluralism and state power receive, as may be expected, greater emphasis in a book
coming from the London School than in one that might come, say, from the Yale
Law School; a concept-jurisprudence is still under attack variously by those in-
terested in social change and those interested in an open-eyed inductive approach;
the struggle of intellectual absolutisms against pragmatic or instrumental approaches
has taken on fresh and sharp meanings; radical and conservative approaches to
economic institutions cast their shadow, although they do not appear in the fore-
ground. On the whole the quarrels turn out to be ultimately not quarrels of method,
or even of doctrine, but of the directions in which the body of legal institutions and
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doctrine is to be shaped. The body of legal thought as it comes down to us in any
one intellectual generation is a curious blend of elements from the past that are
archaic, some which possess continuing vitality, preoccupations of the present, fore-
shadowings of the future. Each school, in its attempt to shape this material to its
own purposes, will lay a varying emphasis on the entities with which legal thought
deals: on legal rules, legal doctrines, legal institutions and agencies, logical and
philosophical truth, social institutions, social fact and policy, class interest, state
power.
Within this common circle of interests many of the essays have a richness of im-
plication and a freshness of their owyn. Professor C. A. W. Manning writes of Austin
and Austinianism with intelligence, discrimination and considerable wit. He revisits
Austin as Wordsworth once revisited Yarrow, and he finds, as Wordsworth did, that
the reality rivals even the fond memory of earlier 'days. Since Austin first sought,
in his Province of Jurisprudence Examined, to keep jurisprudence within well-marked
limits, the stars in their courses have fought against him. The historical and socio.
logical movements in jurisprudence have both crept abroad; new and strange growths
have arisen in anthropology, psychology, political theory, radical economic policy-
growths that have made the province of jurisprudence even more cluttered and untidy
than Austin found them in his day; he has become a fair mark for every young
theorist impatient of the restrictions of an imperative theory of law or feeling him-
self too hemmed in by the precision of Austin's method. We have grown accustomed
to, and, like Professor Manning, a bit tired of, hearing Austinianism called narrow
and mechanical. The very volatile and amorphous character of legal thinking today
makes it all the more necessary not to minimize the achievement of a man for whom
law was granite and whose mind was a deftly handled chisel.
Mr. Robson's just and ordered essay on Sir Henry Maine presents that amazingly
fertile mind as a sharp contrast to the rigid analysis, the unsentimental and persistent
way that Austin had of keeping his eye always on the object. Mr. Robson empha-
sizes Maine's "brilliant, comprehensive, illuminating generalizations," the "eminent
peak from which he surveyed the world," the fact that "he blazed a great trial and
opened up the heavens"; but he points out also that later knowledge has shown many
of his conceptions quite fantastic, and he adds some strictures especially upon Maine's
conservative political theory. There is much in the ferment of Maine's mind that
makes him "modern" although he wrote seventy-five years ago, and the explorations
which we are making today into related fields in the interests of jurisprudence are in
the tradition of the forays that Maine made. Despite these wide views Maine's mind
was not flabby and liberal; it was tough and Tory, and he wrote some of the tough-
ness of his Tory outlook into his glorification of private property which he put
ostensibly into the form of a discourse on Ancient Law. Mr. Robson notes (and this
view may be found stated with greater particularity in Mr. Smellie's very suggestive
article on Maine in Economica) that for Maine private property and civilization "are
inextricably entangled." Maine should have set on our own Supreme Court. He
would have been a worthy successor to Marshall, and he could have fought lustily in
the days after the Fourteenth Amendment for due process and liberty of contract and
the fabric of civilization-so lustily that it would have taken half a dozen Brandeises
to undo his work.
The frontal attack on Austinianism comes, however, not from Maine's historical and
comparative school but from some of the French and English jurists outside of it,
and it has been directed not only against the imperative theory of law but especially
against the monistic view of sovereignty. This attack is quite adequately represented
here. Mr. Ivor Jennings, the editor, writes of the French institutionalists, Hauriou
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and Renard, who break a lance for the Catholic church and natural law, and attempt
a fusion of neo-Thomism and recent institutional theory in their attack on the state.
Mr. B. A. Wortley writes of G~ny, who is attacking the too rigorous method of in-
terpreting the French code and who makes a plea for greater judicial discretion and
for law as a social science. Professor Laski, himself a leader of the pluralist forces,
contributes in his unfailingly lucid and trenchant manner an essay on Duguit's con-
ception of the state, in which he points out that while Duguit is effective in his
criticism of the exclusive claim of the state to sovereignty, his own constructive
formulation of his legal theory was indecisive. "It never does harm," says Mr.
Jennings at the conclusion of his essay on the French institutionalists, "to be told
repeatedly that the State is only one among institutions." I should grant such a
statement my mild assent, but I should point out the possibility that too continued
repetition might in the end prove 'merely boring. And I should subscribe whole-
heartedly to Professor Laski's warning that it will not do merely to deny the exclusive
sovereignty of the state; such a denial must, in addition to rejecting the metaphysic
it is attacking, construct for itself a new and more satisfactory metaphysic. And
that is the one thing that both pluralism and institutionalism, whether in economics,
political theory or law, have thus far failed to accomplish. The analysis of social
institutions given by Hauriou and Renard seems pitifully inadequate when compared
with the analyses of Veblen, Mclver or Hamilton; yet even they have some of the
indicia of transitional gropings for a reality not found in the narrower formulations.
For the German theorists this metaphysical realm is the realm of certitude. The
unfailing logic of Stammler and Kelsen has a terrible insistent sequence even when
it is crossing the widest of abysses. Professor Ginsberg's sympathetic and discrimin-
ating analysis of Stammler is all the greater achievement when it is remembered that
nothing short of expository genius would be adequate to make transparently lucid
the thought of a man who defines law as das unverletzbar selbstherrlich verbindende
Wollen. Mr. Lauterpacht's essay on Kelsen is so conscientious in its fidelity to the
original body of thought that it cannot help being arduous in the reading, though it
is ultimately rewarding. It requires a continuous intellectual athleticism to follow
the far-roving and exacting mind of Kelsen, and at least one reader can testify to
being muscle-bound in the end. But no legal thinker today is so rich and challenging
in all the resources and implications of his thought as is Kelsen. Both Stammler and
he are rationalists; both are neo-Kantian in persuasion and critical in method; both
are impatient of the current fashions in the direction of empiricism and sociologism.
But Stammler ends by basing himself vaguely on a theory of the objective ends of
law, to be ascertained by reason; Professor Ginsberg points out acutely that it is too
abstract a view of reason, "which, while doing lip service to a remote idea of reason,
leaves actual law and actual morals at the mercy of empiricism and the blind force
of tradition." Kelsen on the other hand not only manages to make metaphysical
ends meet in his system, but also gives an overwhelming impression of the richness
of philosophical resources and the breadth of social yision which he possesses but
which he is deliberately excluding from his legal theory. His thinking represents the
most heartbreaking form of intellectual asceticism that one is likely to encounter. I
cannot help deploring that sort of hari-kari because I feel that what is required today
is not an austere dissociation between moral Weltanschauung and legal science but an
equally austere and heroic attempt to effect a thorough integration of the two. Never-
theless Kelsen will continue for a long time to have real validity for American legal
thinkers. That validity lies in his unsparing treatment of the "needs of life" schools,




This is a charge to which sociological schools of law are forever laying themselves
open. Recent American thought, which is largely sociological, offers thus a delicate
problem for analysis; in the march of legal thought it has been definitely in the van-
guard, yet it may be questioned whether it has not pushed ahead so unheedingly as
to cut itself off from its base of supplies. Sir Maurice Amos' essay on Dean Pound
does not raise any such disquieting suggestion. It is on the whole an urbane com-
mentary in which one could hope that some of the urbanity had been replaced by
the sort of thoroughgoing critical analysis which Pound's importance warrants. Such
an analysis would reveal that Dean Pound's thought is neither so summary in its
outlines nor so static as Sir Maurice's essay gives it the impression of being. Not so
summary, because Pound has qualified and subtilized his sense of law as primarily an
ideological entity, moving on an ideological plane, as he has also his animus against
the "inhuman strictness" and the "coldly syllogistic method" of the Austinian school;
not so static, because Pound's thought has always oriented itself toward some specific
intellectual and institutional situation in the law, seeking to change or reform, and
can accordingly be best understood in terms of such a development. But a rigorous
analysis of Dean Pound might reveal also that, large as he will loom in the final his-
tory of American legal thought, he has been attempting an essentially impossible task.
His thought has sought to move in two worlds. On the one hand, it has emphasized
the lag of the law behind the realities of economic change, and has sought to close
the gap; on the other hand it has consistently denied that economic realities have
anything to do with the movement of legal ideas or institutions. This bifurcation has
become increasingly obvious as Pound's labors have borne fruit in the field of legal-
institutional reform and attention has been shifted from his "social engineering" con-
ception of law to his emphasis on the autonomous development of legal ideas.
The American realists, while they have much in common with Dean Pound, find
themselves on the whole leading the opposition at present. It is unfortunate that
Professor Goodhart's essay on them is the only one in the book which is so un-
sympathetic to the intellectual system of the subjects discussed as to put the reader
definitely on his guard. Professor Goodhart gives the impression of being out on a
heresy hunt, and of having a decided flair for it. He writes with wit and abandon,
and some of his sentences pack a lot of dynamite. The useful thing he has done has
been to isolate five rather popular tendencies in present-day American thought and
subject them to thorough-going analysis: the stress on the uncertainty and atomism
of the law, the attack on logic, the stress on psychology, the attack on legal termin-
ology, and the tendency to measure the law in terms of its effects. Some of these I
should wish to deplore almost as much as Professor Goodhart does. But I should
hesitate to regard them as constituting a school. One would be hard put to it to
discover among these five traits any common or unifying element. Much of the con-
fusion in the discussion of American "realism" lies in the fact that it does not con-
stitute a philosophical category or position. It is more likely to be based on an
economic attitude or a social Weltanschauung. It derives from the general revolt
against formalism, which it shares however with Pound, Holmes, Cardozo and even,
to some extent, a rationalist like Cohen. It derives more specifically, however, from
a pragmatist-behaviorist-institutional set in social thought, and from a common
economic liberalism. The real meaning, for example, of the intellectual passage of
arms that Professor Goodhart describes between Jerome Frank and John Dickinson is
revealed less clearly in the pages of any book than it is in the work of these two men
within the Roosevelt administration. Pascal's remark that "three degrees of eleva-
tion of the pole reverse the whole of jurisprudence" might be equally applicable if
the reference were not to the physical climate but to the climate of economic
opinion.
Sarah Lawrence College MAX LERNER.
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ESSAYS AND NOTES ON THE LAW OF TORT AND CRIME. By Nicholas St. John
Green. Menasha: George Banta Publishing Company. 1933. pp. vii, 220.
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS. By Fowler Vincent Harper. Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrll Co. 1933. pp. cxi, 714.
THE LAW OF THE PRESS. Second Edition. By William G. Hale and Ivan Benson.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1933. pp. x, 610.
FILIAL respect and devotion is probably chiefly responsible for the publication of
the little volume of Nicholas St. John Green's scattered essays and notes. Green
died a young man in 1876. He was preparing to write a treatise on torts and
gave promise of valuable contributions to legal scholarship generally, when untimely
death frustrated his plans and disappointed the expectations of his friends. The
essays and notes collected in this volume were published between 1869 and 1876-
the essays in the American Law Review, the notes in the eighth edition of Story
on Agency and in the two volumes of criminal cases which Green collected. They
are, thus, largely unrelated fragments. Three of the essays are in the form of
book reviews-reviewing Bishop on the Law of Married Women, Townsend on
Slander and Libel and Sourdat's treatise on the French law of torts. The remain-
ing three essays are entitled "Proximate and Remote Cause," "Contributory Negli-
gence on the Part of an Infant" and "The Three Degrees of Negligence." The
twenty-one notes, varying in size from a few lines to twelve pages, cover a wide
range of subjects and include such titles as Mandate in the Roman Law, The Punish-
ability of Children, The Power of the Will Over Conduct, Requisites of an Indictment
for Murder, The Powers and Duties of Attorneys at Law, Rape under the'Statutes
of Westminster.
But there is enough in these fragments amply to sustain the editorial comment in
the American Law Review of 1876 that by Green's death "the world has lost work
which it could ill spare, and which it would certainly have known." Though their
value for legal research is necessarily limited, the essays and notes make delightful
reading even at this day. The English was good when it was written and is even
better today. Detailed learning, wide culture, good sense and touches of humor
adorn some of the essays. The piece on "Married Women" is still informative,
suggestive and entertaining both for the legal historian and for the lay reader.
Some of the criticism in the essays and notes is perhaps out of date; some might
have been written in 1934. Writing in 1871 about the "popular" subject of "reforms
in the criminal law," Green lamented a little the loss "of the much, and in many
respects wrongfully, abused science of special pleading." The "relaxation" in this
respect and the resulting "loose practice" necessarily tend to form in the prosecuting
officer "a habit of carelessness in drawing his indictments" with consequent negligence
in the preparation and trial of cases. "Newspaper clamor" about the occasional
criminal who escaped "because an indictment has been inartificially drawn" is
avoided, but "more guilty persons escape through flaws in the evidence" which
the "precision" in preparation requisite under the strict rules of pleading would
obviate. (pp. 151-153) On the other hand, in 1874 he said of "proximate cause"
and its verbal variations: "Now all these expressions are vaguei they mean little; and
in the majority of instances in which they are employed they probably mean nothing.
• ..When a court says this damage is remote, it does not flow naturally, it is
not proximate; all they mean, and all they can mean, is, that under all the cir-
cumstances they think the plaintiff should not recover. They did not arrive at
that conclusion themselves by reasoning with those phrases, and by making use
of them in their decision they do not render that decision clearer to others. The
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employment of such phrases has never solved one single difficulty, from the case
of the disappointed lover and the blacksmith, two hundred and fifty years ago, to
the last case. . . ." (pp. 82-83).
Professor Harper's volume presents a systematic treatment of the entire field of
tort law. It analyzes and states the orthodox tort doctrine in the orthodox manner
but in currently fashionable language. The short legalistic title on the cover,
"Harper on Torts" is extended on the fly leaf to "A Preliminary Treatise on Civil
Liability for Harms to Legally Protected Interests." The organization and approach
is in large part that employed by Professor Bohlen (to whom gracious acknowledg-
ment is made) in his Cases on Torts and in the American Law Institute's Torts
Restatement. The book is written in a clear style with frequent references to the
Restatement and legal periodicals and adequate, though not exhaustive, citation of
cases. On the whole, the treatise fulfills its purpose admirably. It is probably
the best available modern short statement of the doctrine in the law of torts and
is a good companion for the Torts Restatement.
The Law of the Press is a law book for journalists. In some six hundred pages
it attempts to acquaint journalists with the various phases of the law which they
are apt to encounter: libel, privacy, contempt of court, constitutional guaranties
of free press, copyright, official and legal advertising, the legal nature of news vend-
ing, rights and duties of news-gathering agencies, and miscellaneous statutes gov-
erning the press. About two-thirds of the volume consists of reprints of opinions
in reported cases. The remainder is devoted to the authors' statement of the
legal doctrine which the cases are intended to illustrate. The text is, of course,
elementaiy and the knowledge conveyed is perforce partial, but it suffices to
apprize the reader of dangers.
Yale School of Law. HARRY SHULMAN.
THE DIVORCE COURT. Volume II, Ohio. By Leon C. Marshall and Geoffrey May.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1933. pp. 440.
THE authors vigorously pursue their trail blazing research in judicial statistics, diag-
nosing Ohio divorce as a companion volume to their Maryland study last year. They
admit that no suggested legal improvements for American divorce are readily apparent
from the study of only two states. Conservative Maryland and liberal Ohio, although
neither state is an extremist in divorce, show startling distinctions in court practice
and in the socio-economic background of the litigants, and these differences are fur-
ther accentuated by comparing counties within each state. The suspension of the In.
stitute of Law of Johns Hopkins University precludes further studies in this series,
but the appendix lists comprehensive questionnaires and schedules for the guidance of
proposed researches in other states.
Over half a million American men, women and children are each year lured into
the quicksands of the divorce trap. Even the ravages of the depression, which re-
duced the national income by over 50% from 1929 to 1932, made a dent of only
20% in the United States divorce rate. Ohio is seventeenth among the states in its
divorce rate, but all states with higher divorce percentages, except Florida, are west
of Ohio. Of the 88 counties in the state, 8 urban counties containing the cities of
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus, Toledo, Akron, Dayton, Youngstown, and Canton
produced two-thirds of the divorce output. The per capita divorce rates in these
city counties are markedly higher than in the rural counties, although Cincinnati and
Youngstown are exceptions to this rule.
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The laboratory sample analyzed in this study consists of 9,234 Ohio divorce cases
for the last 6 months of 1930. The scholarship of the work is attested to by 66
tables, 42 charts, and several hundred cited court decisions. Ohio divorce history
since the days of the Northwest Territory is significant in the paucity of precedents
to bind county judges. A Supreme Court decision in 1836 denied review of divorce
cases, reasoning that appeal of divorce suits was opposed to public policy because
of possible remarriage. This was altered by the revised state constitution of 1912,
but appellate courts have been very reluctant to reverse divorce decrees. Decision
in the reviewing court must be unanimous, and is required to fall within a period
of 70 days from the divorce decree. As higher courts frequently do not deliver
opinions on divorce decisions, and as such opinions often are not published, the local
judges in 88 Ohio counties are permitted a wide latitude of viewpoint, with the result
that there exists a broad diversity of divorce practice in the state.
Fascinating nuggets of information, unobscured by any such alluring statistical de-
vice as a correlation coefficient, are of practical interest to the trial lawyer. Only
about one divorce in seven is contested, and generally that is merely a technical
reply concerning alimony or custody of children. Less than 2% of Ohio divorces
are denied. Court costs of divorce, required to be bome by litigants, average only
$12.78. Nevertheless, 222% of the plaintiffs file affidavits of poverty to avoid this
charge. Only 19% of childless wives secure either alimony or property, and alimony
settlements average merely $9.04 a week even where children are included. The sec-
ond year of marriage is most fashionable for Ohio divorce applicants, but this mode
is not high, being simply 9% of the total. Seven years of marriage are the median
average for all Ohio divorces. Ohio permits the comparatively lax procedure of ser-
vice by publication in divorce cases, if the residence of the defendant is proved to
be unknown or outside the state. Publication means merely printing the notice in
some unread legal periodical and this process occurs in one-third of the cases. One-
fourth of the women are granted the right to restore their former names. The chap-
ter on Hares and Tortoises elicits the fact that three months is the average length
of time required to obtain a divorce, although wide variation exists among the coun-
ties. The state law provides for a period of six weeks as a minimum between the
tinie of filing of suit and granting the divorce decree. Cases contested or denied
average six to seven months. Over 99% of divorce suits are terminated in court the
day they are begun. The authors explode the myth of migratory divorce, as negli-
gible percentages of applicants come to Ohio to evade stricter state laws or move
from one county to another inside the state to avoid stem judges. The volume
earlier referred to on divorce in Maryland discovered that divorce practice in Balti-
more was largely concentrated in the hands of a few attorneys. Similar quasi-monop-
olies existed in Ohio in Toledo and in semi-rural Licking County, but the fruits of
the divorce traffic in Cleveland were bountifully shared by numerous lawyers. Coun-
sel fees in Ohio in the depression year 1930 ranged from less than $25 to $2,000,
averaging $50. per divorce, but Cleveland lawyers garnered an average $100 for each
broken marriage.
As to the vital matter of the causes of divorce, investigators well realize that court
records are almost barren of accurate signposts. The legal grounds for divorce in
Ohio are adultery, desertion, habitual drunkenness, extreme cruelty, imprisonment,
and gross neglect of duty. Such grounds may reveal, but more likely conceal, the
true causes of family breakdown. Ohio court decisions state that mental suffering
caused by one spouse "such as to impair the health of the other in body or mind,"
"profane and abusive language by a husband and charges of his wife's unchastity"
and "failure of a husband to resent insults offered to his wife in his presence" may all
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constitute extreme cruelty. Gross neglect of duty is a catch-all omnibus ground in-
cluding almost any frivolous charge except incompatibility. It is defined as failure
to provide, attended with circumstances of indignity, aggravation, or insult. This
ground for divorce has risen in popularity until it now is the legal excuse for almost
two-thirds of Ohio divorces.
Ohio for many years has pioneered in Domestic Relations Courts in the eight urban
counties. With two partial exceptions, these courts have made slight headway with
the problem of the causes and cures of divorce. The training and professional back-
ground of the judges and court attendants are virtually the same as in other courts.
Quoting the authors: "The tenacity of custom is exemplified in Domestic Relations
Courts. Even there where socialization of court procedure is supposed to have gone
furthest and where the judges have been quite inventive in developing new techniques
for juvenile cases, divorce procedure remains largely what it was a century ago."
Aided by advice of forty-two judges and social scientists, Professors Marshall and
May formulated an elaborate schedule of more than 100 questions concerning the
social, economic, moral, religious, and racial backgrounds of divorce applicants. This
was submitted to 4,000 plaintiffs and testimony was noted in these cases for fre-
quently repeated points. Conceding the limitations of this somewhat introspective
psychological technique, as many divorce applicants do not know their own motives,
this research, whenever published, can be the most intensive statistical analysis of
causes of divorce in a section of America. As the United States for generations has
held the highest divorce rate in the world with the possible present exception of Soviet
Russia, it is a challenge to the lawyer and statistician to discover the social causes of
family breakdown.
New York City. ALrFED CAHEN.
CouRTs AND JUDGES IN FRANCE, GERmANY, AND ENGLAND. By R. C. K. Ensor. Lon-
don and New York: Oxford University Press. 1933. pp. vi, 144.
THIS little volume (based on lectures delivered at the London School of Economics)
contains a succinct and readable survey of the judicial systems of the three leading
European countries, and contrasts the English system with the other two. The
author is not wanting in regard for the integrity, impartiality, and ability of British
judges, but he recognizes that these qualities are exhibited also in high degree by their
continental brethren. On the other hand, he is not, as are perhaps the majority of
his professional colleagues, so obsessed by a consciousness of the superiority of English
legal institutions as to be blind to their many defects. He differs also from the
general run of English lawyers in believing that much may be learned from a study
of the constitution and working of foreign courts. His book fully justifies this be-
lief, and its publication is opportune, for questions of legal reform are at present
receiving in England much attention.
The position of French and German judges is in a number of respects materially
different from that of English judges. They form a profession distinct from that of
the Bar, and are recruited not from the ranks of elderly, successful advocates, but
from the youth of the universities who qualify after graduation by special examina-
tions, supplemented by a period of student apprenticeship. They are, by comparison
with English judges, poorly, even miserably, paid; yet they remain incorruptible.
High salaries are therefore, the author observes, clearly not necessary to secure purity.
Their real reason and justification in England is rather that they are in fact moderate,
if not small, compared with the earnings of the leading barristers, from among whom
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appointees to the bench are drawn. In France, judges do not sit singly, but in groups,
ranging from a minimum of three in the tribunals of first instance, to sixteen in the
august Court of Cassation. Whatever virtue there may be in the principle of
'collegiality,' it appears, especially in the higher courts, to have been carried too
far, and to have resulted in a judiciary of excessive size. Lastly, while the English
judge, when once appointed, no matter to which court, never looks for and seldom
obtains promotion, to the continental judges promotion is the "very breath of life."
They belong to a much-graded hierarchy, and for advancement must look at every
step to the Ministry of Justice, at whose head is the Minister, i.e. a parliamentary
politician. This situation tends to have unfortunate consequences, particularly in
France, for the most powerful deputies, who wield considerable influence with the
Minister, are, as a rule, advocates by profession, and certain of them become
fashionable primarily because they "are widely believed to be able to intimidate the
judges whose promotion may lie at their mercy." Upon the basis of this belief,
which he apparently regards as well-founded, Mr. Ensor unequivocally asserts that
"the French judge is decidedly less independent than the English."
While the continental judges are in many respects not so well circumstanced as
the British, the justice they administer not only compares favorably in quality-at
least in civil cases-but is dispensed much more cheaply. The excessive cost of
litigation in England is in part due to the higher cost of advocacy, and in part to the
higher cost of procedure, particularly in regard to evidence.- Almost every document
and fact must be proved by the personal testimony of the parties and of witnesses,
all of whom must attend the court. The very considerable expenditure and personal
inconvenience which this requirement frequently entails is avoided in France and
Germany, where proof is primarily documentary. Since the London Chamber of
Commerce complained in April, 1930, about the strict requirements of the English
laws of evidence and other costly aspects of English procedure, some modest conces-
sions, it may be noted, have been made under the New Rules of Procedure of May,
1932.1
Mr. Ensor regards the Appellate Court system of his own country as decidedly
less satisfactory, from the standpoint of the litigant, than that of the two continental
countries. In the latter, the general rule is one appeal and no more (for 'revision'
by the Court of Cassation differs from appeal in the accepted sense of the term), but
in England there may be two, or even three. It is possible for an action commenced
in a County Court to be carried through the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal,
and the House of Lords, and for the entire taxed costs of this protracted litigation
to be thrown on the eventual loser, even though three of the four tribunals may
have pronounced in his favor. This situation adds not only to the cost of litigation,
but to its uncertainty, which is, in any event, likely to be greater under case law
than under codes. It is interesting to note that the Business of the Courts Committee,
in its Second Interim Report published two months ago,2 recommended the abolition
of the Divisional Court and the transfer of its present jurisdiction to the Court
of Appeal. The Committee did not, however, purpose to interfere with the duplica-
tion of appeal facilities in the form of the coexistence of the Court of Appeal with
1. See Davies, The English New Procedure (1933) 42 YAtE L. J. 377.
2. Cmd. 4471 (1933). This committee was appointed by the Lord Chancellor in
December, 1932, under the chairmanship of Lord Hanworth, the Master of the Rolls, to
consider whether greater expedition or greater economy in the administration of justice was
practicable. A previous Interim Report was published as Cmd. 4265 (1933).
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the House of Lords. The original scheme of the Judicature Act of 1873 was, as Mr.
Ensor notes, to make the Court of Appeal in fact the Supreme Court of Judicature,
but the opposition of the House of Lords to the abolition of its appellate functions
led to the passing three years later of a second act setting up a tribunal of Law Lords
to exercise the ancient appellate functions formerly attributed to the Second Chamber
as a whole. "Why in these circumstances," writes Mr. Ensor, "the Court of Appeal
was not abolished and its judges invited to serve as the first Law Lords it is difficult
to say. Litigation in England," he adds, "would certainly have been cheaper and more
expeditious had that course been adopted."
Yet another respect in which the English judicial system lags far behind that of
France and Germany is in the provision for localized services. All civil actions on
appeal and many classes of cases on first instance can be heard only in London. The
continental countries have an excellent system of localized appeal courts, and pro-
vincial litigants are not obliged, as they often are in England, to resort to the capital
to have their disputes adjudicated, with the result that they are spared considerable
inconvenience and expense. Such decentralized machinery as England possesses in
the form of the Assize Circuits is, as Mr. Ensor makes plain, archaic, expensive to
the nation, wasteful of judicial time, and in no way equivalent to the localized higher
court facilities of France and Germany. Reform of the Circuit system is, as the
Business of the Courts Committee recognizes, long overdue. It is not possible, how-
ever, within the compass of a short review, to examine Mr. Ensor's proposals for
modernizing the system, as an alternative to its abolition, or to compare them with
the majority and minority recommendations of the Committee.
For that singular English institution, to which there is no counterpart on the
continent-the "unsalaried, untrained, legally inexpert, lay magistrate"--the author
has hardly a word of defense. He regards it, in relation to modem requirements of
criminal justice, as a complete anachronism, from which immense mischief results.
Few dispassionate observers would controvert this view. But while he believes that
it would be best to abolish the 'Great Unpaid' altogether and replace them with
trained stipendiaries, he realizes that, as most of them are active party workers, the
formidable opposition they would offer to their own extinction might deter any
government from proceeding with the necessary measure. He suggests therefore, as
a compromise, that the unpaid magistrates might be retained as a panel from which
lay assessors would be drawn to sit beside the stipendiary, and gives a short useful
account of the German 'Sch~ffengerichte,' in which such an association of lay judges
(Sch~ffen) with professional ones is effected with excellent results. This proposal is
well worthy of consideration.
The English judicial system suffers finally, in Mr. Ensor's opinion, from the
absence of a Ministry of Justice. He is convinced of the desirability of such a de-
partment, in which would be centralized the functions now scattered between a
medley of authorities, notably the Lord Chancellor and the Home Office, and which
would be responsible for the mapping out and co-ordination of judicial services. It
is true that one consequence of the existence of such a Ministry in France is to
weaken in the subtle way mentioned the independence of the judiciary, but, under
English conditions, where promotions are extremely rare, any such result need hardly
be feared.
Enough has been said to indicate that here is a stimulating monograph which
should command the attention not only of lawyers-American as well as English-
but of laymen interested in problems of law reform or in the comparative study
of social institutions.
Yale School of Law. WILLLA H. WYNNE.
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